From Galwan to Dialogue
India-China relations have been under severe strain since the Galwan Valley clashes in June 2020, which marked
the worst border violence in 45 years. The disengagement process has been slow, trust remains low, and strategic
competition has deepened.
In this context, the August 2025 visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi for the 24th Special
Representatives (SR) Meeting on the Boundary Question marks a cautious but significant diplomatic opening.
Judging by official statements, the visit was “extremely productive,” and signals both sides’ intent to move beyond
the standoff — though not without strategic reservations.
“The border is quiet, but not yet resolved.” – NSA Ajit Doval“
Historical Background: The Trust Deficit Runs Deep
● The India-China boundary dispute dates back to colonial-era ambiguity, with disagreements over the
Line of Actual Control (LAC) stretching 3,488 km.
● Major military tensions include:
○ 1962 war
○ 1986 Sumdorong Chu crisis
○ 2013 Depsang standoff
○ 2017 Doklam standoff
○ 2020 Galwan clashes, with casualties on both sides.
● Despite multiple agreements — 1993 (Peace & Tranquility), 1996 (CBMs), 2005 (Political Parameters),
and 2013 (Border Defence Cooperation) — the Galwan incident exposed the failure of prior trust-based
frameworks.
“History shows that peace agreements are only as strong as political will.” – Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran”
Visit Overview and Its Diplomatic Significance
Hosted at India’s Invitation
Wang Yi’s visit was initiated by an invitation from NSA Ajit Doval, underscoring India’s willingness to resume
structured talks via the SR mechanism — a forum crucial for confidential discussion on boundary issues.
High-Level Engagements
Besides boundary talks, Wang Yi also:
● Met External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar for bilateral dialogue.
● Was received by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, signaling high political priority.
This level of access reflects New Delhi’s calibrated openness to diplomacy, but from a position of strategic
caution.
Upcoming SCO Summit in Tianjin
PM Modi confirmed that he would attend the SCO Summit in Tianjin, where a bilateral meeting with President
Xi Jinping is expected — the first such meeting post-Galwan, potentially offering space for direct leader-level
reset.
Key Outcomes: From Freeze to Functional Diplomacy
1. Reopening Channels of Engagement
● Revival of the SR-level boundary talks (first since 2022).
● Commitment to build upon the 2005 Political Parameters agreement.
● Agreement to expedite resolution of the 3,500 km border dispute.
“We agreed that peace on the border is essential for the overall relationship.” – Dr. S. Jaishankar“
2. Resumption of Border Trade and Travel
● Border trade reopened at three passes: Nathu La, Lipulekh, and Shipki La.
● Direct commercial flights between India and China to resume.
● Expanded Kailash Manasarovar Yatra slots for Indian pilgrims.
● Relaxed visa rules to promote people-to-people engagement.
These are confidence-building measures (CBMs) aimed at normalising routine contact, though they don’t
address the military disengagement fully.
3. Talks on Trade Barriers
India sought relief from Chinese export restrictions on:
● Fertilizers (essential for agriculture)
● Rare earth materials (key for electronics and defence)
● Industrial boring machinery (used in infra projects)
China showed willingness to consider easing these restrictions.
However, there was no progress on Beijing’s demand to roll back India’s FDI restrictions on Chinese
investments, imposed after Galwan due to national security concerns.
“Economic interdependence is welcome, but it cannot come at the cost of strategic vulnerability.” – C. Raja Mohan
Geopolitical Concerns: The Underlying Strategic Mistrust
1. Post-Visit: China Courts Pakistan and Taliban
After India, Wang Yi visited Kabul and Islamabad to:
● Extend BRI and CPEC projects into Afghanistan, through Taliban cooperation.
● Discuss regional security and infrastructure alignment with Pakistan.
India has long opposed CPEC and BRI on grounds that:
● CPEC passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), violating Indian sovereignty.
● BRI challenges India’s regional influence and connectivity sovereignty.
“BRI without Indian consent is strategic intrusion.” – Brahma Chellaney
2. Diplomatic Shielding of Pakistan
China refrained from condemning the Pahalgam terrorist attacks or offering support during Operation Sindoor
— India’s anti-terror operation.
Instead, the Chinese Ambassador to India remarked that “Pakistan too is a victim of terrorism” — drawing a
false equivalence that undermines India’s narrative.
This omission is troubling and underscores the limits of current diplomatic engagement.
3. PLA Presence and Incomplete Disengagement
Despite NSA Doval’s comment that “the borders have been quiet,” there is no resolution in key areas like:
● Depsang Plains
● Demchok sector
China still blocks Indian patrols, violating past commitments. Military friction remains alive, even if silent.
India Balancing China and the West
Interestingly, Chinese Ambassador Xu Feihong criticised U.S. tariffs (50% on Indian exports), calling it “bully
behaviour.” This may reflect:
● China’s attempt to present itself as a better economic partner.
● India’s rising trade friction with Western nations, especially the U.S.
However, the editorial wisely cautions that India must not enter into a China reset due to temporary Western
pressure or trade friction. Strategic autonomy must remain India’s compass.
“Strategic autonomy must not translate into strategic confusion.” – TCA Raghavan
Data & Facts:
● India-China trade (2024): $136 billion
● Trade deficit: $80+ billion
● 20+ rounds of military talks since 2020
● SCO includes India, China, Russia, Pakistan, Central Asia
● CPEC investment: $62 billion
Strategic Caution, Not Strategic Amnesia
1. Ensure Full Military Disengagement
India must push for status quo ante of pre-April 2020 positions at all friction points, especially Depsang.
2. Institutionalise Diplomatic Channels
Resume and regularise SR-level talks, foreign minister dialogues, and working-level meetings.
3. Balance Engagement with Deterrence
Continue military readiness along LAC while resuming CBMs, trade, and people-to-people contact.
4. Reject False Narratives on Terrorism
Demand that China publicly recognise India’s concerns on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.
5. Use Multilateral Platforms Wisely
Leverage SCO, BRICS, and G20 to:
○ Isolate Pakistan on terror
○ Restrain China’s regional overreach
○ Present India as a responsible regional power
6. Don’t Rush into Normalisation
India must not confuse stability for trust. Strategic clarity must underpin every engagement.
“We should talk to China, but not forget Galwan.” – Indian Defence Analyst“
A Reset, But Not a Reconciliation
Wang Yi’s visit signals a measured thaw, not a full reset. While trade, travel, and diplomacy are being restored,
core concerns — including territorial sovereignty, Chinese support to Pakistan, and military tensions — remain
unresolved.
India must walk this tightrope with strategic caution and clear red lines. The success of this new phase in IndiaChina relations will depend not on how quickly ties are restored, but how firmly India safeguards its national
interest while doing so.
